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Introduction
The sometimes hidden ramifications o f jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter 
o f  Rights and Freedoms' over the past two decades can be better appreciated by 
considering this jurisprudence against the private/public paradigm, that is a 
framework exploring how the private and public intersect.
As feminist analysis has taught us, understanding how the public and private 
spheres do interrelate and how they should interrelate is crucial to advancing the 
project o f equality.2 The recognition by our legal system that activity which occurs 
in private may deserve the same sanction as similar activity occurring in public, as 
in the case o f assault, or that certain activities .should not be labelled as “private” to 
remove them from public sanction, as in the case o f workplace harassment, has been 
highly significant in breaking down the barriers between private and public which 
helped to maintain the subordination o f women.
Among feminists, this analysis has become perhaps too limiting to address the 
more nuanced inequalities that still exist and the intersectionalities o f women’s 
identities. The paradigm is still useful, however. For example, the abuse in 
residential schools, then in private, now exposed to public view, has taught us more 
recently that the failure to explore the way in which public and private intersect may
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1 Part I of Schedule B to the Constitution Act, 1982.
2 Discussion of the public/private paradigm and a very few examples of its application can be found in 
the following: Jane Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years o f State Intervention in the Family 
(Toronto: Women’s Press, 1992); Daphne Spain, Gendered Spaces (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992); Janet Guildford & Suzanne Morton, eds., Separate Spheres: Women’s Worlds in 
the 19*-Century Maritimes (Fredericton, N.B.: Acadiensis Press, 1994); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
“Abortion: On Public and Private,” in Alison M. Jaggar, ed., Living with Contradictions: Controversies 
in Feminist Social Ethics (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994); Patricia Hughes, ‘The Evolving 
Conceptual Framework of Sexual Harassment,” (1994) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 1.
perpetuate oppression. At the same time, there are areas o f our lives where we 
should be free to make our own decisions, unencumbered by public sanction, as in 
at least some aspects o f our reproductive and sexual lives. The idea o f privacy may 
seem out-moded in these days o f internet and television self-exposure when some 
people are eager to reveal the most intimate -  or mundane -  aspects o f their lives and 
others revel in learning about them. Yet those who reveal are choosing to make the 
private public for the edification o f others. The concern o f the legal system needs 
to be for those whose ostensible “choices” are more determined by societal norms, 
values and strictures, than by their own free will, as well as for those situations 
where allowing choice ignores the public ramifications of those choices. Where the 
boundaries between public and private are properly drawn is assuredly a contentious 
and evolving issue, but that there are boundaries and that they are permeable must 
be accepted. Traversing this complex terrain o f the public/private requires an 
appreciation both o f how private decisions and actions have public consequences and 
how public policies can affect private behaviour.
With respect to the Charter, the public/ private paradigm underlies both the 
application o f the Charter (to whom and in what context) and the ways in which 
findings about “choice” have infused decision-making under the Charter. Since the 
Supreme Court o f Canada’s first decision addressing the issue o f the Charter's 
application, R. W.D.S. U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. ,3 the Court has gradually expanded 
the scope o f its application. I suggest that in doing so, it has not adequately 
addressed either the significance o f the public/private boundaries it has drawn, 
implicitly or otherwise, or the public/private ramifications of defining certain 
activities as “choices.”
The public/private paradigm is at the heart o f the Charter’s application. On its 
face, the Charter applies only to the legislatures and government. Yet the question 
of its application has proved to be far from simple, for underlying its application 
have been a number o f often unarticulated questions: What are the consequences of 
insulating entities from Charter scrutiny on the basis that they are “private?” What 
are the implications o f imposing constitutional obligations on non-governmental 
entities? When do public authorities have the right to limit private choices? How 
does law prohibit and promote choice? When is choice a public rather than a private 
affair? When do public authorities have an obligation to enhance opportunities? Are 
public decisions ever “neutral?” How are choices that restrict the lives o f others 
addressed through rights discourse? And, how does the Charter help us address
3 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [Dolphin Delivery].
these questions?
While all these and, no doubt, other questions pose exciting and challenging 
issues about the application o f the Charter, and thus are worth raising in the context 
o f applying the public/private paradigm, I cannot hope to answer them all here. My 
purpose, then, is to offer some general observations about the implications o f several 
decisions for the development o f Charter (and Charter-related) jurisprudence over 
the past twenty years using the public/private paradigm as my framework.
Private Litigation and the Common Law
Subsection 32(1) o f the Charter determines to whom and in what contexts the 
Charter applies:
32.(1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within 
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory 
and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province.4
The meaning and objective o f subsection 32(1) appear straightforward enough: the 
Charter is intended to apply only to public bodies or, put another way, private actors 
owe no constitutional duty to other private actors. This is exactly how the Supreme 
Court o f Canada interpreted subsection 32(1) in Dolphin Delivery. But, o f course, 
private actors may employ the Charter to change the nature o f their private 
relationship and to require other private actors to act in a manner consistent with 
constitutionally mandated legislation, since all legislation is subject to the Charter 
(unless the legislature invokes section 33 o f the Charter to exempt legislation from 
the impact o f certain Charter- provisions).5 This is, then, the first and most obvious 
way in which private relationships can be affected by the Charter. It is an extremely
4 Supra note 1.
5 An obvious example is found in a challenge to family law legislation governing support on separation 
which resulted in the application of the relevant provision to same-sex relationships: M. v. //., [1999]
2 S.C.R. 3.
significant way in which private individuals may be subject to constitutionally 
mandated obligations even though they are not imposed upon the individuals 
directly.
In these instances, the question of choice raises issues not easily resolved. In M. 
v. H., two women had entered into an intimate relationship at a time when same-sex 
relationships did not have legal recognition. Upon the dissolution o f their 
relationship, one o f the couple challenged the exclusion o f same-sex couples from 
the support provisions of Ontario’s family law legislation, provisions which applied 
to both common law and married different-sex couples. The success o f the 
challenge constituted recognition, in this limited way, at least that same-sex 
relationships were worthy of public recognition. Marriage is not yet a legal option 
for same-sex couples; thus it is not possible to conclude, as is the case with different- 
sex common law couples, that same-sex couples have rejected marriage as the way 
to structure their relationship.
Recently, the majority o f the Supreme Court o f Canada held that the exclusion 
of co-habiting (different-sex) common-law couples from the presumption under 
Nova Scotia’s matrimonial property regime o f an equal division o f property on 
separation did not contravene the Charter's  equality guarantee under subsection 
15(1).6 At first blush, this seems a surprising result, since the Court had previously 
held that exclusion o f common law spouses from insurance policies did contravene 
the Charter1 and, it must be said, against the historical background o f a particularly 
dramatic family law case in which a common-law wife’s property rights were 
protected through the mechanism o f a constructive trust.8 Seen another way, 
however, this case involves the impact o f the diminishing differences between legal 
marriages and common-law relationships, on the one hand, and the increasing
6 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 [Walsh]. By the time the case had reached the 
Supreme Court, Nova Scotia had enacted legislation permitting both same and different-sex partners to 
register as “partners” and thus bring themselves within the matrimonial property regime. Under this new 
system, all couples must take a positive step, either by marrying or by registering their partnership. It 
is not unreasonable to infer that this change made it “easier” to conclude that there was not an 
infringement of section 15. It must also be recognized that it would have been difficult to exclude same- 
sex couples from the presumption had only common-law different-sex couples been added to the 
legislation.
7 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. In this case, of course, a third party had determined that 
common-law couples would not benefit from provisions which benefited legally married couples.
8 Pettkus v. Becker, [ 1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. At least Rosa Becker’s share was legally protected on the basis 
that her common law spouse had been unjustly enriched by her contribution to their relationship, 
although she never actually received her share and eventually committed suicide.
freedom to choose to marry or to live common-law, on the other. Many couples 
have chosen not to marry at least in part to avoid the obligations the law imposes on 
married persons; and today it is less likely that couples are “forced” to have a 
common-law relationship because they are unable to marry.
In Walsh, the majority o f the Court emphasised the significance o f personal 
choice in determining the structure o f personal relationships and suggested that those 
who are not in a common law relationship out o f choice may take steps to bring 
themselves within the matrimonial property regime. Not only does different 
treatment not indicate lack of respect for the merit or dignity o f persons in common 
law relationships, the majority concluded it positively “respects the fundamental 
personal autonomy and dignity o f the individual.”9 L ’Heureux-Dubé J., in dissent, 
emphasized that the nature o f the relationship is functionally similar, since 
individuals in both married and common law relationships have need for a 
redistribution o f economic resources when the relationship breaks down and that 
partners should be presumed to make the same contribution to both kinds of 
relationships.
Walsh is a case o f its time: within its parameters we find the focus o f a liberal 
emphasis on individual private choice confronted by a desire to establish systemic 
public policy methods o f protecting individuals during a period o f significant 
societal change. Is this a case where recognizing difference reduces or enhances 
inequality? Or is the desired result more complicated: designing a way for public 
regimes to promote ways in which individuals are able to implement their own 
choices in the most effective way?
In contrast, in Symes v. Canada the majority’s conception o f choice failed to 
take into account the impact o f societal or public expectations and assumptions on 
private arrangements.10 Symes, a female lawyer, unsuccessfully challenged the 
limited deduction o f childcare expenses under the Income Tax Act, comparing it to 
the scope permitted business expenses. Symes is a “difficult” case in a number of
9 Walsh, supra note 6 at para. 62 (per Bastarache J. for the majority).
10 Symes v. Canada, [ 1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [Symes]. Symes is not an example of private litigation to which 
the Charter applies through a challenge under the Charter by one of the parties to legislation, as in M. 
v. H. and Walsh, but an example of how “public” litigation (here tax litigation) involves conceptions of 
the structure of private relationships. For an examination of the concept of “choice” in this case, see 
Rebecca Johnson, “If Choice is the Answer, What is the Question? Spelunking in Symes v. Canada," in 
Dorothy E. Chunn and Dany Lacombe, eds., Law as a Gendering Practice (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).
respects and a different appreciation o f “choice” might not have led to a different 
result. Yet there is no doubt that Symes was not considered an appropriate claimant 
under the Charter because she was insufficiently disadvantaged for the majority (a 
view scathingly rebutted by L ’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ. in dissent) and 
because she had made a “personal” decision to have children. The majority neatly 
separated this private personal choice from Symes’ experience in the public sphere, 
not unlike failing to appreciate how public decisions to deny contraception and 
abortion confine women’s private lives and choices and consequently are detrimental 
to women’s capacity to participate fully in the public sphere.
Dolphin Delivery also established â distinction between the impact o f positive 
law or legislation and the common law on private litigation. Dolphin Delivery, a 
courier company in Vancouver, did deliveries in the area for Purolator, which was 
based in Ontario. Purolator locked out its employees and after the lockout, Dolphin 
Delivery carried out deliveries for Supercourier, a company associated with 
Purolator. Dolphin Delivery obtained an injunction against threatened secondary 
picketing against it by members o f the RWDSU. The union argued that the 
injunction contravened its freedom o f expression under the Charter. Although 
finding that secondary picketing is a form o f protected expression, but that enjoining 
it was justified under section 1 o f the Charter, McIntyre J., for the majority, actually 
decided the case on the basis that the Charter did not apply. Since the Canada 
Labour Code11 (which applied to the federally regulated employer) did not contain 
relevant picketing provisions, the common law regulated the secondary picketing. 
McIntyre J. held that while the Charter applied to the common law, it did not apply 
to litigation between private parties when the common law was at issue. The 
common law, he maintained, is subject to the Charter only in the context of 
government action and in Dolphin Delivery, there was no government action and 
thus the Charter did not apply. McIntyre J. distinguished the court’s obligation to 
“apply and develop the principles o f the common law in a manner consistent with 
the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution” from the view that one private 
party owed another private party a constitutional duty.12
Dolphin Delivery meant that significant interests may receive constitutional 
protection in some jurisdictions and not in others because they are raised in the 
context o f private litigation. This somewhat unsatisfactory result was subsequently 
partially addressed by the Court’s breathing life into McIntyre J.’s comment in
"R.S.C. 1970, c. L-l.
12 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 3 at 603.
Dolphin Delivery that the judiciary should develop the common law in a manner 
consistent with constitutional values. In Hill v. The Church o f  Scientology, the Court 
carried out a Charter-like analysis in order to determine whether the common law 
tort o f defamation conformed to Charter values (it did).13 In its Pepsi-Cola decision, 
the Court revisited the common law prohibition on secondary picketing, and this 
time was not only willing to assess it in light o f Charter values, but to modify it to 
permit secondary picketing o f work sites, exactly the issue in Dolphin Delivery .14
The Meaning of “Government”
The cases I have considered thus far illustrate both that how the Charter is applied 
breaks down the barriers between private and public, through the Charter values 
doctrine, and the importance o f understanding the particular relationship between the 
public and private spheres in any given case. The most significant expansion o f the 
application o f the Charter, however, has arisen in the context o f interpreting 
subsection 3 2 (l)’s reference to “all matters within the authority o f Parliament” and 
“all matters within the authority of the legislature o f each province,” or, to put it 
more concisely, in the context o f determining the meaning of “government.”
The major cases dealing with the scope o f “government” involved challenges to 
mandatory retirement in five universities, a community college and a research 
hospital.15 In the case o f the community college, the college was managed by a
13 Hill v. Church o f Scientology o f Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. The analysis includes a justification 
process that resembles but is not the same as the section 1 analysis. Significantly, the individual 
challenging the common law has the onus to show that the common law conflicts with Charter values 
and when the values are balanced, to show that the common law should be modified. The burden does 
not shift to the party relying on the common law rule. The Court has shown its willingness to modify 
common law rules, given that they are made judicially: see e.g. R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 and 
R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8 [Pepsi-Cola]. 
Daviault successfully brought a challenge under section 7 of the Charter to a common law rule that an 
extreme state of drunkenness amounting to automatism could not constitute a defence to a general intent 
offence. Pepsi-Cola, between two private parties, was a “Charter values” case.
14 Pepsi-Cola, ibid.
15 McKinney v. University o f Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [McKinney] addressed mandatory retirement 
in four Ontario Universities: Guelph, Laurentian, York and Toronto. Another case decided at the same 
time dealt with mandatory retirement at the University of British Columbia: Harrison v. University of 
British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 450. Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 570 involved the community college and Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 concerned the research hospital.
board appointed by the provincial government and vulnerable to direction by the 
government.16 The Court held that the college was part o f the “apparatus of 
government both in form and in fact” and thus was “performing acts of 
government.”17 It was therefore subject to the Charter, even with respect to its 
employment practices, including mandatory retirement, provided for by the 
collective agreement negotiated between the board and the faculty association.18
The University cases provide the more interesting consideration o f the 
relationship between private and public with the members of the Supreme Court 
divided on their conceptions o f the role o f public education. Writing the majority 
judgment La Forest J. rejected as criteria for determining whether an entity is 
“government” for the purposes o f the Charter that the entity is a statutory body (“a 
creature o f statute”), that it may perform an important public purpose, or that it 
receives public funding. Thus the universities’ reliance on government does not 
mean that they are “organs o f government.” Government does not control 
universities, which are legally autonomous and which make important decisions, 
such as those regarding promotion and tenure, without government interference.19 
Wilson J. (with whom Cory J. concurred) proposed criteria addressing the extent of 
government control over the entity, whether the entity performs a function 
recognized as a government responsibility and whether the entity acts according to 
statutory authority in the broader public interest. Finding that an entity met one or 
more o f these criteria would be a strong indicator, although not determinative, that 
the entity constituted government. Wilson J. found that universities satisfied these 
criteria.
16 Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association, ibid.
17 Ibid. at 584.
18 In Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne], a teaching 
master who objected to the way the union spent compulsory union dues could not challenge the union’s 
activities directly, since the union was not subject to the Charter, but he could challenge the collective 
agreement which had been negotiated by the Ontario Council of Regents for Colleges of Applied Arts 
and Technology which was subject to control by government. The Council’s agreement to the 
compulsory dues provision constituted government action. In Lavigne, La Forest J. specifically rejected 
the argument that, because with respect to its contractual and commercial activities the government was 
acting as a private entity in contrast to its regulatory functions, these contractual and commercial 
activities should not be subject to the Charter.
19 The University of Guelph was subject to the Ontario Human Rights Code which was subject to the 
Charter, at that time Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53. The Court held that the limitation in 
section 9(a) of the Code which defined age in the employment context to mean “an age that is eighteen 
years or more and less than sixty-five years,” thus permitting mandatory retirement, violated section 15's 
equality guarantee, but was justified under section 1.
The Court applied a similar analysis to whether a hospital was subject to the 
Charter in Stoffman. The majority held that, although the mandatory retirement 
policy imposed by a hospital board regulation had to be approved by the Minister o f 
Health Services and Hospital Insurance, the day to day activities o f the hospital were 
not subject to government control. Furthermore, even though the hospital provided 
an important public service, this was not sufficient to bring it within subsection 32( 1 ) 
o f the Charter.
Generally speaking, the university cases established a “government control” test 
for an entity to be subject to the Charter. Yet the statutory authority test has also 
served to bring entities within the purview o f the Charter which might be thought 
o f as private entities. Thus the rules governing self-governing professions are 
subject to the Charter, even though these professions establish these rules partly in 
order to avoid government control which might occur if the professions did not do 
this themselves.20
The Court’s decisions with respect to which entities or conduct falls within 
subsection 32(1) do not make it easy to determine which entities are “government” 
and which are not. On the one hand, it seems clear that with respect to government 
entities, they will be subject to the Charter for all purposes. On the other hand, a 
determination that an entity is not government does not mean that it will not be 
subject to the Charter for some purposes. In McKinney, La Forest J. had commented 
that “where a statute authorizes a person to exercise a discretion in the course of 
performing a governmental objective,” the Charter would apply. “But,” he 
continued, “the Charter was not intended to cover activities by non-governmental 
entities created by government for legally facilitating private individuals to do things 
o f their own choosing without engaging governmental responsibility.”21 Thus where 
an entity is not in itself government, some o f its activities might be subject to the 
Charter if they engage governmental responsibility. This was the case in Eldridge 
v. British Columbia (Attorney General), where the Court held that the Charter 
applied to hospitals when they were carrying out a specific government mandate,
20 Black and Co. v. Law Society o f Alberta,[ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 591, involving a rule established by the Law 
Society prohibiting partnerships with non-resident lawyers. The Court did not explicitly address the 
applicability issue, but simply applied the Charter to the Law Society’s rules.
21 McKinney, supra note 15 at 266. Corporations are the clearest example of private entities which are 
required to comply with certain legislative standards, but are not controlled by government. Self- 
governing professions, however, are viewed as exercising a control delegated by government.
The inquiry in the “specific government function” cases is not into the nature of 
the entity, but into the nature o f the activity. The question is not, “is this a branch 
o f government?” but rather, “is this otherwise private entity entrusted with carrying 
out a specific governmental function?” Government cannot be allowed to evade 
constitutional responsibilities by delegating their programs to private entities; form 
will not supercede substance in these cases. O f course, what is considered 
“governmental” depends on political culture and history. Thus provincial 
governments are now considering privately-run prisons subject to government 
guidelines. In contracting out responsibility for running prisons, has government 
also delegated its constitutional obligation to deal with prisoners in compliance with 
the Charter? On the case law, it would seem not. But when does government by 
proxy shift to private activity that is not subject to the Charter?
Blurring of the Boundaries: Implications for the Public-Private Divide
The cases addressing the application o f the Charter have gradually pushed back the 
boundaries o f contexts or disputes which are subject to the Charter. The way they 
have done so, however, fails to take into account the implications for the relationship 
between private activity and its public ramifications. This does not mean that the 
Charter should apply directly to private relationships. This would run counter to the 
plain words o f subsection 32(1), as well as have practical consequences: in 
McKinney, La Forest J. had commented that if the Charter applied to private 
activities, it “could strangle the operation o f society” and “impose an impossible 
burden on the courts.”23
What underlies the expansion o f subsection 32(1)? When do we care that 
constitutional principles or values apply? When does it matter? At a minimum we 
would expect the law itself to accord to constitutional expectations and in our system 
o f law, that should include the common law, as well as statutory law. The decision 
in Dolphin Delivery was disturbing because it did not seriously view the law itself 
as a separate repository o f Charter values, a situation partially remedied by Hill v.
22 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. The hospital did not provide 
translation services for the deaf; subsection 15( 1 ) requires that health services be provided equally and 
therefore translation must be provided since this is an integral part of the provision of health services.
23 Supra note 15 at 262.
Church o f  Scientology and Pepsi-Cola. I f  a party wishes to rely on a law to protect 
its behaviour or to challenge the behaviour o f another party, then it should expect 
that the law is vulnerable to constitutional challenge, whether common law or 
statutory law. Furthermore, criminal accused can challenge common law rules as 
constitutionally invalid,24 while private parties cannot, even though the interests 
concerned may be equally significant.
Another way we might consider this question is to ask what interests should 
attract constitutional protection or supervision? The Supreme Court’s apparent 
greater willingness to impose positive obligations on government coupled with a 
better understanding o f the public ramifications o f private decision-making and 
action may contribute to ensuring that certain groups are not denied the benefit o f 
the Charter because o f boundaries which are permeable in some instances and not 
in others. While it is not possible to explore this area further in this commentary, 
section 7 of the Charter provides fertile ground for recognizing the significance of 
private interests which are equal in worth to those found in contexts in which the 
Crown is directly involved.25
The fact that private activity can have detrimental implications for the ability of 
a group to engage in the public sphere was recognized in Dunmore v. Ontario 
(Attorney General) which concerned the exclusion of agricultural workers from the 
protection o f Ontario labour relations legislation.26 At trial, Sharpe J. had held that 
the Charter did not apply because the problems facing agricultural workers in 
organizing stemmed from the conduct o f employers, not the government, and there 
was not a positive obligation on government to remedy this situation.27 The majority 
o f the Supreme Court not only redefined the parameters o f the guarantee o f freedom 
of association under section 2(d) o f the Charter, but more significantly for the 
analysis held that the government had an obligation to protect the workers from the
24 There is no issue because the prosecution is government action. See e.g. Daviault, supra note 13.
25 See e.g. Patricia Hughes, “New Brunswick (Minister o f Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.): En 
Route to More Equitable Access to the Legal System” (2000) 15 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 93. The possibility 
of a broader interpretation of section 7 is found in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 
84.
26 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.
27 Ibid. The case was complicated by the fact that one government had enacted legislation to govern the 
labour relations of agricultural workers and this legislation had been subsequently repealed by its 
successor. Thus Sharpe J. was concerned about “constitutionalizing” the legislation granting the workers 
protection. Seen more simply, however, the case was really about the exclusion of the workers from the 
current legislation.
action o f private employers. The decision reflected an understanding o f the public 
ramifications o f  private activity. The reason that employers could be successful in 
preventing agricultural workers from organizing is that these workers, particularly 
in need of protection, had no protection in the way many —  indeed, most —  other 
workers did.
The same understanding was not present in Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia College o f  Teachers.19, Trinity Western University (“TWU”), a private 
institution, had offered a teachers’ training program o f which one year was 
implemented under the aegis o f Simon Fraser University. TWU wanted total control 
over the program and applied to the British Columbia College o f Teachers for 
approval o f the program. The BCCT refused approval because TWU expected 
students and teachers to sign a Declaration o f Community Standards which required 
them to refrain from a list o f “practices that are biblically condemned,” including 
“homosexual behaviour.” As an administrative law matter, the issue to be decided 
was whether the BCCT had acted appropriately in taking into account what it 
perceived to be discriminatory provisions in the Declaration in deciding whether to 
approve the program. The BCCT had concluded that it was against the public interest 
to approve the program when its graduates would be teaching in the public school 
system. Writing for themselves and six other judges, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. 
held that the BCCT had jurisdiction to consider whether a program involved 
discrimination, but that its decision not to approve the program was unfair.
The mandate o f the BCCT under the Teaching Profession Act was to establish 
“standards for the education, professional responsibility and competence o f its 
members,. . .,” taking into account “the public interest.”29 The majority recognized 
the importance o f teachers in transmitting values, saying at para. 13, “[i]t is obvious 
that the pluralistic nature o f society and the extent o f diversity in Canada are 
important elements that must be understood by future teachers because they are the 
fabric of the society within which teachers operate and the reason why there is a 
need to respect and promote minority rights.” Since “[s]chools are meant to develop 
civic virtue and responsible citizenship, to educate in an environment free o f bias, 
prejudice and intolerance,” then the factors that the BCCT should take into account 
cannot be limited to skills and knowledge and can include discriminatory practices.30
28 [2001 ] 1 S.C.R. 772 [Trinity Western University], This is not a Charter case, but raises Charter values 
which in part motivated the decision of the British Columbia College of Teachers (“BCCT”).
29 Teaching Profession Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 449, s. 4.
30 Trinity Western University, supra note 28 at paras. 13-14.
The BCCT erred, however, in not taking into account TWU’s freedom o f religion 
and reconciling it with the equality rights o f gays and lesbians (and the need for an 
atmosphere of tolerance in the school system).31
Most significantly, in the context o f the impact o f the private on the public, the 
majority stated that “[i]t is important to note that this is a private institution that is 
exempted, in part, from the British Columbia human rights legislation and to which 
the Charter does not apply.”32 At para. 34, the majority explained that consideration 
o f human rights values in the case requires “consideration o f the place o f private 
institutions in our society and the reconciling of competing rights and values.” 
While critical o f the BCCT for “privileging” equality rights over freedom o f religion, 
the majority is prepared to privilege the private nature o f the institution over the fact 
that it wants approval to participate in the public sphere. Because it is a private 
institution, it is not subject to the Charter and because it is a private religious 
institution, it is exempted from human rights legislation. TWU is not content to 
remain a private institution, however, but wishes to play a public role. As 
L ’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting, pointed out at para. 62, “[a]ctions in the private 
sphere can have effects in the public realm.” This was a case in which the majority 
of the Court failed to recognize that the boundary between the private preferences 
o f TWU and the impact o f TWU’s graduates in a public school system is a highly 
porous one. If  it were not, TWU would not be interested in training teachers in a 
particular way.33
31 The majority concluded that the standard of review was the correctness standard, in part because the 
discriminatory practices issue transformed an inquiry about educational practices into one about human 
rights.
32 Ibid. at para. 25.
33 Trinity Western University should be read in conjunction with Chamberlain v. Surrey School District 
No. 36, 2002 SCC 86 [Chamberlain], in which the Court considers the importance of teaching about 
equality in the public school system and the place of private parental preferences in determining how 
that teaching can occur. Chamberlain is also an administrative law rather than Charter case, and both 
Trinity Western University and Chamberlain are determined on the basis of the standard of review the 
majority and dissenting judges consider appropriate. Yet both cases discuss the impact of Charter 
principles. Furthermore, Trinity Western University involves a requirement that future teachers refrain 
from “homosexual behaviour” and Chamberlain involves an attempt by some parents through the School 
Board to deny discussion of same-sex families in grades K-l. The materials at issue in Chamberlain 
were supplementary and would be used at the option of teachers, including those who graduated from 
the TWU program.
Conclusion
Taken at face value, the decisions o f the Supreme Court o f Canada which expand the 
application o f the Charter seem to blur the boundaries between government or 
public obligations and obligations o f entities otherwise recognized as private, both 
through the implementation o f the “Charter values” approach and the “specific 
government function” analysis. Yet the Court’s understanding o f “choice” and other 
cases involving the difficult reconciling o f apparently dichotomous rights suggest 
that it has not yet fully learned the lesson inherent in the public/private paradigm: 
while we may wish to retain an area o f privacy, we cannot be complacent about the 
extent to which private decisions and actions have public consequences and therefore 
must be subject to public control or protection. Over the next decade o f its 
jurisprudence, the Court will have to consider situations which come before it as a 
result o f the expansion o f the application o f the Charter and increasingly reconcile 
the demands o f individual choice and public regulation, as well as the dichotomous 
nature o f certain rights and freedoms. As it does so, it might find the public/private 
paradigm a helpful framework.
